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__________________________________________________________ 
This article attacks “open systems” arguments that because constant 
conjunctions are not generally observed in the real world of open 
systems we should be highly skeptical that universal laws exist. This 
work differs from other critiques of open system arguments against laws 
of nature by not focusing on laws themselves, but rather on the inference 
from open systems. We argue that open system arguments fail for two 
related reasons; 1) because they cannot account for the “systems” 
central to their argument (nor the implied systems labeled “exogenous 
factors” in relation to the system of interest) and 2) they are 
nomocentric, fixated on laws while ignoring initial and antecedent 
conditions that are able to account for systems and exogenous factors 
within a fundamentalist framework. 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction. This article attacks the argument that because universal 
laws are not generally observed in the real world of open systems we 
should be highly skeptical of their universality. This argument is 
especially associated with Nancy Cartwright, who has branded the belief 
in universal laws of nature as “fundamentalist” and whose work 
especially has attracted numerous counterarguments (e.g., Kline and 
Matheson 1986, Poland 1994, Anderson 2001, Sklar 2003, Spurrett 
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2001, Hoefer 2003, Psillos 2006. For the sake of brevity we will focus 
primarily on Cartwright’s work). However, her arguments have been 
resilient; in a 1999 article Earman and Roberts even profess that they 
“do not know how to begin to assess Cartwright’s claim about context-
specific factors that in principle elude theoretical treatment” (456). 
Crucially, however, most of the critiques of open system arguments 
(including more recent critiques) are focused on laws themselves in one 
way or another.
1
 We find these attacks limited in their effectiveness; 
while they do support a faith in “fundamentalism,” they do not strike at 
the root of the open system argument. This article differs from other 
critiques by not focusing on laws themselves, but rather on the inference 
from open systems to anti-fundamentalism and the importance of initial 
conditions to this inference.
2
 
“Anti-fundamentalists” or “open-systemists” argue that because in 
the real world all systems are ultimately open, we simply do not see 
constant conjunction laws of nature operate, and in experiments where 
we temporarily see constant conjunctions it is only because of human 
                                                 
1
 Other critiques also focus on the inference by many open-systemists from anti-
fundamentalism to “natures,” “tendencies,” or “capacities,” which we do not discuss 
here. If correct, our argument preempts this inference. 
2
 Some of the points briefly raised in Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002 come closest to 
our argument. They criticize Lange 1993, who presents an argument on ‘provisos’ 
similar to the position of Cartwright, for inattention to boundary conditions (Earman, 
Roberts, and Smith 2002, 284) and argue that Cartwright confuses laws and differential 
equations of motion while neglecting initial conditions (286 and endnote 5). Otherwise, 
to our knowledge there has been little sustained attention to the importance of initial 
conditions to the open system argument. Bhaskar 1975 does discuss initial conditions 
towards its conclusion (236-237), however, by that point the discussion is entirely 
within terms of his ‘transcendental realist’ argument. Cartwright mentions initial 
conditions in scattered remarks; again we find no passage that clearly addresses our 
concerns. A point similar to part of our argument on systems is made by Ruphy (2003), 
particularly when she asks Cartwright how theoretical domains are to be divided into 
“bits and pieces” (61). 
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engineered closed systems or “nomological machines.” This argument 
seems motivated by what open-systemists more generally perceive as an 
ill-conceived attempt to explain our complex world with simple 
universal laws. 
The obvious response to the open system argument is that in open 
systems we are seeing the effects of exogenous factors. We control for 
these in our engineered closed systems precisely so we can see laws 
without interference. In the real world, we can then combine the various 
laws to account for what we really do observe. 
Open system arguments generally reject this approach on the 
grounds that it is caught in the twin horns of a dilemma. The first horn is 
that there is no principled way from within a theory to know what to 
control for to get a law – we would in effect need more general laws or 
theories to justify the external conditions we impose on an experiment 
for it to create constant conjunction outcomes. For example, Cartwright 
states “My conclusion … is that we need to add to the basic ‘equations 
of motion’, like F=ma or Schrödinger’s equation, a special constraining 
condition: The equation holds so long as everything that can affect the 
targeted effect is describable in the theory” (Cartwright 2002a, 432-433; 
emphasis added. See also Bhaskar 1975, 12-13) and: 
 
All that is law-like on the Humean picture are associations 
between measurable quantities. That’s it. The only way a 
condition could restrict the range of an association in a principled 
or nomological way would be via a more complex law…The 
effect of this is to move the conditioning factor C inside the 
scope of the law… (Cartwright 1999, 138) 
 
As Cartwright continues, it is clear that she is saying that the 
irregularities we see in the real world must, for the fundamentalist, 
somehow be subsumed under more general laws: The “account of laws 
as regularities goes naturally with a covering law theory of prediction 
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and explanation. One set of regularities – the more concrete or 
phenomenological – is explained by deducing them from another set of 
regularities – the more general and fundamental” (Cartwright 1999, 
138).  
The second horn of the dilemma, because of its obvious nature more 
often implied that stated, is that the idea that there can be regularities 
explaining regularities in an infinite regress (“turtles all the way down”) 
is illogical. For example, Cartwright states that “As I urged in chapter 4, 
the alternative theory of explanation in terms of natures rejects the 
covering law account. You can not have regularities ‘all the way down’” 
(Cartwright 1999, 138; emphasis added). 
 
2. Cartwright’s “St. Stephen’s Square” Example. The way in which 
open-systemists depict the “fundamentalist” as needing to subsume 
deviances from universal laws under more general laws (such as 
Galileo’s constant acceleration and Kepler’s imperfect ellipses 
subsumed under Newton’s laws)
3
 is especially clear in Cartwright’s “St. 
Stephen’s Square” example. This is one of the simplest examples 
Cartwright uses to illustrate her ideas, based on an example by Neurath 
of a thousand dollar bill falling in Vienna’s Saint Stephen’s Square on a 
windy day. (Due to its relative clarity Cartwright’s commitments are 
particularly evident in this example, which is likely why it is frequently 
used against Cartwright e.g., in Spurrett 1999, Smith 2001, and Hoefer 
2003, although for somewhat different reasons than here.) We consider 
this example in some detail to make clear Cartwright’s depiction of 
fundamentalist explanation and its flaws. 
Unlike a compact sphere in a vacuum, which will follow Newton’s 
second law (gravity providing the force), it is impossible to know how 
the banknote will fall on a windy day. In the words of Hoefer: 
 
                                                 
3
 Other examples include the unification of Charles’ law and Boyle’s law under the 
Ideal Gas law and Maxwell’s unification of theories of electro-magnetism and optics. 
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Does this falsify [Newton’s] second law? Of course not, says the 
fundamentalist: the bill’s deviation from a free-fall trajectory is 
explained by other forces on it (the wind and air resistance). But 
where, asks Cartwright, in physics does one get the wind forces 
from? The answer is: nowhere, because physics tells us 
practically nothing about wind or how it affects floppy paper 
objects. (Hoefer 2003, 1406) 
 
Cartwright rejects a faith in a universal law of nature, F=ma, because in 
the real world we observe something other than F=ma. Crucially, she 
depicts the fundamentalist as believing there is a need for the path of the 
banknote to be described entirely by laws of physics. Her view is 
summarized by Hoefer: 
 
To hold that the second law is true in this case, you have to 
assume on faith that if one back-calculates the forces necessary to 
produce the motions of the bill correctly, assuming the second 
law and subtracting the force of gravity, then (a) the forces you 
calculate really did exist, on the bill, as it fluttered around; and 
(b) those forces are in principle derivable from other 
fundamental physical laws (QM, perhaps). This is an awfully big 
thing to take on faith, Cartwright thinks. (Hoefer 2003, 1406; 
emphasis added) 
 
In the words of Cartwright: 
 
Many will continue to feel that the wind and other exogenous 
factors must produce a force…That view begs the question. 
When we have a good-fitting molecular model for the wind, and 
we have in our theory (either by composition from old principles 
or by the admission of new principles) systematic rules that 
assign force functions to the models, and the force functions 
 6 
assigned predict exactly the right motions, then we will have 
good scientific reason to maintain that the wind operates via a 
force. Otherwise the assumption is another expression of 
fundamentalist faith. (Cartwright 1999, 28) 
 
This idea that we explain through subsuming deviations from laws under 
more general laws is not unique to Cartwright, indeed it is widespread. 
According to Halonen and Hintikka, “It seems to be generally believed 
among philosophers that to explain something is to subsume it under a 
generalization” (2005, 57). 
If, however, we restate the open system argument in different 
language, it seems peculiar. Consider the banknote example again. We 
have an explanandum: Why is the banknote falling as it is, rather than 
following Newton’s Second Law, F=ma? (Or to recast it in predictive 
terms: Where will the banknote land in St. Stephen’s Square?) An 
explanans of F=ma is rejected by Cartwright, as Hoefer emphasizes, 
because we have no way within the laws of physics to account for the 
wind as a force as stressed in Cartwright’s quote (1999, 28) above; the 
problem is posed as a problem of the composition of forces. 
But why should the wind be a force to be part of our explanation? 
‘Air’ – i.e. atoms of nitrogen, oxygen, argon etc. – does seem to behave 
according to something like laws of nature (e.g., gas laws). But ‘wind’ – 
i.e. variations in the real-world temperatures and pressures and thus flow 
of masses of air – is a condition of spatiotemporal irregularities in a 
particular part of the universe. The question of “wind” is not one of 
laws, but of how such irregularities in the Earth’s air came to be.  
Crucially, this is where initial conditions play an indispensable but 
frequently ignored role. As we will show below, they are crucial for 
understanding where the irregularities of the universe come from. 
Irregularities, in turn, are crucial to the concept of “system,” compelling 
both the anthropocentric idealization of “systems” (such as a banknote 
falling in a city plaza) and their arbitrarily demarcated “exogenous” 
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factors (such as separating the “wind” from the “system” of a city 
square). Our position boils down to the argument that through using 
laws with initial conditions we can in essence “explain the wind” (that 
is, we can account for the irregularities in the universe) which is in turn 
tantamount to explaining what humans perceive of as systems and their 
exogenous factors. We will first consider in the next section how initial 
and antecedent conditions account for the irregularities in the universe. 
In Section 4 we then discuss how irregularities account for what humans 
perceive as ‘exogenous factors’ and “systems.”  
 
3. Explaining the Wind: Initial Conditions and Irregularities in the 
Universe. Even to the most ardent supporters of universal laws of 
nature, such as proponents of the deductive-nomological (DN) model of 
explanation, it is clear that laws are at most only one part of any 
explanation, with initial or boundary conditions their vital counterpart. 
As Earman and Mosterin note, “[a]s far as we are aware, despite all the 
criticism that has been heaped on Hempel’s DN model, no philosopher 
has criticized it on grounds that it gives prominence to initial conditions” 
(1999, 20n). The problem, which we believe in part has led to the 
acceptance of (or at least the failure to reject) open-system arguments, is 
not that initial conditions have not been criticized in discussions of 
explanation, but that they have received so little attention at all. 
Extended discussions of laws far outnumber extended discussions of 
initial conditions or the related concepts of antecedent and boundary 
conditions. A search in the Philosopher’s Index (1940-2005) for entries 
with the term “laws of nature” in the title finds 124, against only two 
with the term “initial conditions,” a ratio of over sixty to one. If we add 
the terms “laws of physics” on the one hand, and “antecedent 
conditions” and “boundary conditions” on the other, and include both 
the singular and plural forms, the ratio is still 209:4 for titles and 
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562:103 for abstracts.
4
 Wilson (1991), discussing boundary conditions, 
summarizes his view of the level of attention to initial conditions vis-à-
vis laws: “[T]he standard philosophy text says virtually nothing about 
boundary conditions – they are scarcely mentioned before they are 
packed off in an undifferentiated crate labeled ‘initial and boundary 
conditions’ (usually pronounced as one word). The salient fact about 
‘initialandboundaryconditions’ is that, whatever else they may be, they 
are not laws and can be safely ignored” (Wilson 1991, 565).
5
 
How, precisely, do initial conditions account for the irregularities in 
the universe? Due to recent highly detailed maps of the current universe 
such as the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) and the 2-degree Field 
Galaxy Redshift Survey (2dFGRS) and their juxtaposition with highly 
detailed observations of the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) 
from projects such as the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE), the 
Balloon Observations of Millimetric Extragalactic Radiation and 
Geophysics (BOOMERANG), and the Wilkinson Microwave 
Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) it has become increasingly possible to 
empirically test theories of the quantum origins of the universe. This 
specialized field, sometimes known as “precision cosmology,” sets sharp 
parameters for plausible theories of cosmology, falsifying many. The 
current understanding of the initial conditions of the universe, consisting 
of early inhomogeneities arising from primordial vacuum fluctuations, is 
beginning to be understood to account for all later inhomogeneities, 
                                                 
4 Many philosophy articles that do mention initial conditions do so within a modal or 
“possible worlds” context, discussing the necessity/contingency of laws (e.g., 
Schlesinger 1987; Sklar 1991; Beebee 2002; Bird 2002); the direct relevance of these 
to our discussion of explanation in the actual universe is not clear (although see Frisch 
2004 for a possible exception). 
5 Even when initial conditions are recognized as important, precisely how and why 
seldom seems to be pursued by philosophers. For example, in their discussion of 
inflationary cosmology Earman and Mosterin state that “[t]hese issues about the nature 
of scientific explanation and the role of initial/boundary conditions are well worth 
pursuing, but we will not do so here” (1999, 20). 
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verifying earlier theories of inflation that predict effects from primordial 
fluctuations in ways set forth by Albrecht (1996; and contra Earman and 
Mosterin 1999). These increasingly well-supported theories show how 
primordial quantum fluctuations were vastly magnified through 
inflation, and then magnified still further through acoustic oscillations 
(Whittle 2004). This left a spatial imprint in dark matter leading after 
recombination to the eventual spatial pattern of condensation of early 
stars and galaxies. Quite simply, we are beginning to understand the 
development from the true initial conditions of the universe to the 
current vast and intricate irregularities of the universe. 
Just as quantum cosmologists are beginning to understand the 
development from initial quantum inhomogeneities to cosmological 
irregularities, the special sciences have integrated those irregularities 
into their understanding and explanation in their areas of interest. As 
noted above, the irregularities imprinted on dark matter, and 
subsequently on matter, allowed for the condensation of galaxies and 
early stars. These early conditions were the antecedent conditions for 
later galaxy and second and third generation (our sun) star formation, 
with the fate of every star (i.e., becoming helium white dwarfs, 
carbon/oxygen white dwarfs, supergiants etc.) depending on its initial 
mass. Each generation contributed to the ever greater proportions of 
higher elements in the universe through stellar nucleosynthesis, giving 
the higher elements up to iron, with supernovae giving us the still higher 
elements. These early processes led to the precise antecedent masses, 
material composition, velocities, and trajectories of our early solar 
system and the precise eventual series of collisions and accretion that led 
to the Earth’s distinctive structure. Planetary scientists are beginning to 
understand how the exact sequence of accretion of the Earth led to 
critical aspects, such as its large percentage of water (Morbidelli et. al., 
2000; Drake and Righter 2002) and how the oblique-angled catastrophic 
origin of our moon accounts not only for the Earth’s unique spin-axis 
inclinations crucial to our seasons and tides crucial to evolution, but 
 10 
possibly even for the unique plate tectonic activity of the Earth that is 
responsible for its remarkable diversity compared to other planets 
(Hoffman 2001a, 2001b). Biologists in turn explain speciation through 
incorporating the tectonic plate-driven antecedent variation in 
environments. (Much of this story is the story of ever greater 
irregularities and hence complexity of interactions. Occasionally, 
however, there are even still direct effects of ancient spacetime 
trajectories on higher order phenomena, as with the K-T event 65 
million years ago and evolution. More speculatively, it is possible that 
the spacetime trajectory of our solar system still directly affects our 
weather as the entire solar system passes through nebulous arms of our 
galaxy, causing or helping to cause ice ages on Earth [Yeghikyan and 
Fahr 2003, 2004;  Gies and Helsel 2005].) 
Incredibly, there is beginning to be a unified account in theory and 
increasingly verified empirically – with many gaps to be sure – between 
the quantum fluctuations in the early universe to the irregularities of our 
solar system to the irregularities on our planet, and even to how these 
irregularities lead to weather systems today (for example, our extremely 
recent understanding of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation [ENSO] on 
global weather patterns). This unified understanding is reflected, for 
example, in the “Cosmic Evolution” project at the Wright Center at 
Tufts University (“Wright Center”), telling a unified story from 
primordial quantum physics through galactic, stellar, and planetary 
formation to biological speciation; a similar effort is found in Morowitz 
2002. In effect we have, in theory at least and increasingly supported by 
empirical evidence, “explained the wind in St. Stephen’s Square.” This 
has been done entirely within the fundamentalist conception of laws, but 
through the use of initial and antecedent conditions. 
 
4. Initial Conditions and “Systems.” The previous section discussed 
how initial and antecedent conditions are able to account for the 
irregularities in the universe. But what is the relationship between 
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irregularities in the universe and the concept of “system,” especially 
“open” systems (and their necessary corollary, “exogenous factors”)? 
Considering the “decoherence program” in physics helps us see the 
problem the concept of “system” poses for open system arguments and 
their relationship to initial conditions.  
The decoherence program,
6
 like the open-systemist argument, is also 
based on an emphasis on open systems. Furthermore, it too sees the 
problematic attachment to closed systems in physics as stemming from a 
“nomological machines” approach to knowledge in physics: “The idea 
that the ‘openness’ of quantum systems might have anything to do with 
the transition from quantum to classical was ignored for a very long 
time, probably because in classical physics problems of fundamental 
importance were always settled in isolated systems” (Zurek 2003, 717). 
Similarly 
 
In classical physics, the environment is usually viewed as a kind 
of disturbance, or noise, that perturbs the system under 
consideration in such a way as to negatively influence the study 
of its “objective” properties. Therefore science has established 
the idealization of isolated systems, with experimental physics 
aiming at eliminating any outer sources of disturbance as much 
as possible in order to discover the “true” underlying nature of 
the system under study. (Schlosshauer 2004, 1273) 
 
The similarity between the emphasis on the failure of closed systems to 
provide a useful picture of the universe by open-systemists and in the 
decoherence program is striking. 
                                                 
6
  The study of quantum-to-classical transitions with an emphasis on their ubiquity in 
our universe of open systems. Systems can be caused to decohere by outside 
interference as faint as radiation from the Cosmic Microwave Background (Zurek 
1991). 
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Some (e.g., Auletta 2000, 289; Zeh 2005) view decoherence as a 
possible solution to essential problems of quantum physics, notably the 
measurement problem. However, there is a fundamental problem with 
decoherence as something more than a useful approach to comparing 
existing interpretations of quantum mechanics and perhaps pointing to 
new interpretations. Crucially, we believe exactly the same problem 
exists for open system arguments against fundamentalism, yet remains 
unacknowledged. This problem concerns the concept of systems: “In 
particular, one issue which has been often taken for granted is looming 
big, as a foundation of the whole decoherence program. It is the question 
of what are the ‘systems’ which play such a crucial role in all the 
discussions of the emergent classicality” (Zurek 1998, 1818). Similarly, 
Schlosshauer writes: 
 
[T]he assumption of a decomposition of the universe into 
subsystems—as necessary as it appears to be for the emergence 
of the measurement problem and for the definition of the 
decoherence program—is definitely nontrivial. By definition, the 
universe as a whole is a closed system, and therefore there are no 
“unobserved degrees of freedom” of an external environment 
which would allow for the application of the theory of 
decoherence to determine the space of quasiclassical observables 
of the universe in its entirety. Also, there exists no general 
criterion for how the total Hilbert space is to be divided into 
subsystems, while at the same time much of what is called a 
property of the system will depend on its correlation with other 
systems. This problem becomes particularly acute if one would 
like decoherence not only to motivate explanations for the 
subjective perception of classicality…but moreover to allow for 
the definition of quasiclassical “macrofacts.” (Schlosshauer 
2004, 1274) 
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Open system anti-fundamentalist arguments face the same problem, viz. 
What is a (sub)system? Where do they come from? If we cannot answer 
these questions then both the decoherence program and open systems 
arguments like those of Bhaskar and Cartwright face the fundamental 
dilemma Zurek and Schlosshauer point out. (We believe the problem 
raised by Zurek and Schlosshauer strongly applies to 
Bhaskar/Cartwright type open system arguments. However, the 
decoherence program itself may surmount the problem. Primordial 
decoherence is consilient with and probably essential to any future 
understanding of primordial quantum inhomogeneities and their 
amplification to subsequent quasiclassical structure in the universe. See 
Kiefer and Polarski 1998; Kiefer, Polarski, and Starobinsky 1998; Kiefer 
et al 1998; Barvinsky et al 1999; Lombardo 2005.) 
The term “system” is well-known for being difficult to define (see 
Marchal 1975), indeed there is no universally agreed upon definition. A 
closely related and equally problematic term is “structure.” For example 
Shapiro (1997) defines structure in terms of systems: structure is “the 
abstract form of a system, highlighting the interrelationships among the 
objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they 
relate to other objects in the system” (74); he later remarks that “What is 
structure from one perspective is system from another” (94).
7
  
Whatever their precise relation, the concepts of (physical) system 
and structure share the same fundamental problem: The universe as a 
whole is a system or structure, yet there is no non-arbitrary way to 
divide the universe into subsystems or smaller structures. Crucially, our 
divisions seem merely to reflect our anthropocentric perspective, 
pragmatic goals, and cognitive needs. We see (or create) groups of 
                                                 
7 Open-systemists also use the terms interchangeably, e.g. in reference to economics 
and its “concepts” (law-like regularities) Cartwright states that: “nothing follows from 
the concepts themselves without embedding them in a structure, and only special 
structures [i.e. “nomological machines”] will yield any deductive consequences at all” 
(2002b, 147).  
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objects acting in some way and idealize them as a system – a machine, a 
government, a galaxy, a solar system, a planet, an ecosystem – in order 
to understand their properties that interest us. But the boundary 
conditions that define these systems (or structures) are idealized by 
humans. There may well be steep changes in matter densities, types, or 
other properties that form apparently natural boundaries and define a 
system (as in a solar system), but these are never complete; idealized 
systems are in the end open. A paradigmatic example might be the 
idealization of our sun and its planets as a solar system but our later 
understanding that this is more open than we expected, with the Oort 
Cloud spawning comets reaching the interior of the system from 
influences as distant as passing stars and interstellar molecular clouds. 
Because there never seems to be true closure in the universe, the 
problem with all subsystems becomes one of boundary conditions 
regressing to the true initial conditions of the universe. This is a problem 
even in our most abstract theoretical concept of system/structure, much 
less in our ‘messy’ universe of open systems. For example, Carter 
remarks that “mathematicians prove things about smaller structures by 
placing them in larger ones” (2005, 298). (The problem of boundary 
conditions within boundary conditions leading back to the beginning of 
the universe is of course well known, e.g., Causey 1969, 232 and Price 
2002, section 3.1. Bhaskar notes this possible objection to his argument 
[1975, 68-69] but does not develop a defense against it).  
As we saw in Section 4, quantum cosmology has begun to explain 
how primordial inhomogeneities led to the later inhomogeneities of our 
universe. We propose that it is these inhomogeneities (and their 
subsequent interactions) that motivate our idealizations of systems and 
structures. This is evident in the way these concepts are defined in terms 
of entities that occupy space, that is to say, spatial irregularities (i.e. 
“objects” and “components”). For example, “system” “implies an 
interconnected complex of functionally related components” 
(Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff 1957, 7) and “[a] system is a set of 
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objects together with relationships between the objects and between 
their attributes” (Hall and Fagen 1956, 18). Even in the most abstract 
approach to the concept of system and structure, mathematics, these are 
defined in spatial terms. A system is “a collection of objects with certain 
relations” (Carter 2005, 293, summarizing Shapiro 1997) and a structure 
is “a collection of places with relations and/or functions defined on those 
places” (Carter 2005, 305, summarizing Resnik 1997). Indeed, if we 
could somehow imagine a perfectly homogenous universe it would seem 
impossible to imagine how systems/structures might exist. There would 
be no components or objects to interact with one another. Crucially, it is 
the development from primordial irregularities of the later irregularities 
in the universe that gives us “objects” and “components” that can 
interact and which we idealize as systems or structures. Open system 
anti-fundamentalist arguments are silent on this issue. The 
fundamentalist approach (with initial conditions), however, is both 
theoretically and increasingly empirically successful in accounting for 
the irregularities that form the basis for human conceptions of 
system/structure. 
 
5. Why Initial Conditions Are So Often Ignored. If initial conditions 
are so important, why are they so frequently ignored, as we saw in 
Section 2? One possibility is that the focus by philosophers on the heroic 
period of law seeking from the Enlightenment to the twentieth century 
has served to obscure the importance of initial conditions to the 
philosophy of science. There are likely at least two more reasons, (i) our 
anthropocentric view of time and (ii) quantum uncertainty.  
An anthropocentric view of time seems to make us loath to the idea 
that ancient initial conditions control outcomes on cosmological time 
scales. For example, in a frequently cited passage (e.g., Clarke 1999, 9-
10; Waldner 2002, 21) from The Chances of Explanation, Humphreys 
asks us to 
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Consider a man who, on a whim, takes an afternoon’s 
motorcycle ride. Descending a hill, a fly strikes him in the eye, 
causing him to lose control. He skids on a patch of loose gravel, 
is thrown from the machine, and is killed. This sad event, 
according to the universal determinist, was millions of years 
beforehand destined to occur at the exact time and place that it 
did…This claim, when considered in an open-minded way, is 
incredible. (Humphreys 1989, 17) 
 
Yet human incredulity is not a firm basis for a philosophy of science. If 
we are to believe that some “uncaused cause” has intervened between 
the initial conditions of the universe and later outcomes, it must be 
shown how, when, and where this has occurred. So far this has not been 
done. 
Just as with Humphrey’s rejection of the effect of initial conditions 
over large time scales, so too with quantum phenomena: If we are to 
claim quantum uncertainty has made the universe fundamentally 
probabilistic at the quasiclassical level, we must show how and when. It 
is natural that a belief in ontological chance would reduce the emphasis 
placed on initial conditions in the philosophy of science. The hallmark 
of deterministic systems is extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, while 
in indeterministic systems their importance is greatly diminished 
(because of the opportunity for “chance” to change outcomes; this seems 
especially likely over long time periods, hence Humphrey’s view). The 
open-systemist neglect of initial conditions and its attack on 
“fundamentalism” is part of a broader anti-deterministic (or pro-
probabilistic) consensus that stems in part from the advent of quantum 
physics. Cartwright introduces The Dappled World by declaring that 
“[f]or all we know, most of what occurs in nature occurs by hap” (1999, 
1) while Bhaskar pronounces regularity determinism “a mistake, which 
has been disastrous for our understanding of science” (1975, 69).  
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Despite common conceptions, however, it is not at all clear that 
quantum physics has overturned determinism (Earman 2004). The very 
difficulties encountered by the probabilistic consensus in providing a 
coherent model of explanation in our view suggests something 
fundamentally wrong with the probabilistic assumption (i.e., the failure 
of all attempts to form consistent accounts of macro- and probabilistic 
causation, with “causation” remaining an inelegant folk science [Norton 
2003], while a conserved quantity, non-probabilistic [i.e. deterministic], 
reductionist [i.e. non ontological-emergentist] view of causality remains, 
it seems, entirely intuitively and theoretically coherent [Burock 2004]). 
Rather than continuing on what has proven to be a barren intellectual 
path (at least for reaching a consistent understanding of explanation), 
perhaps it is time to pay more attention to initial conditions and how, 
together with laws, they can and are explaining the (weak, non-
ontological) emergence of and interactions between the many 
phenomena in the universe that interest humans. As Halonen and 
Hintikka state, “finding the right ‘initial conditions’ is in practice usually 
the most important part in the process of explanation” (2005, 48). 
Indeed, for explaining much of what interests philosophers, scientists, 
and laypersons alike about the universe and our world initial conditions 
are in a sense significantly more important than laws, because while 
laws constrain, it is initial conditions that account for the initial variation 
and subsequent rich and beautiful complexity in the universe.  
 
6. Conclusion, and How Quantum Indeterminacy May Still Cause 
the Perception of Chance in the Universe. Cartwright has written that 
once we “climb up” to the most fundamental laws of nature, there is no 
way “within a pure regularity account to climb back down again” (1999, 
95, a point she reemphasizes in 2002a, 438, note 15). Yet this is 
precisely what antecedent conditions, traced ultimately back to true 
initial conditions, allow us to do. They provide the rough surface, as it 
were, on which to apply our climbing toolkit of laws, allowing the 
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descent to the concrete situations we want to explain. Furthermore, the 
irregularities that can be traced to initial conditions account for the 
anthropocentric perception of systems and their exogenous factors. Open 
system arguments, however, are tellingly silent on the ontology and 
origins of “systems” – the very basis of their argument. 
Overall, humans seem to have a deep desire to see causal relations 
between the emergent irregularities (“systems,” “structures,” “objects,” 
“components”) of the universe, and thus we look for non-existent 
constant conjunctions between these. We agree with open-systemists 
such as Bhaskar and Cartwright that these do not exist, and that this is a 
highly significant fact. But the empirically supported interpretation of 
this fact is that the macro relations that we do see are spatiotemporal 
trends, trends that ultimately stem from irregular micro initial conditions 
in a universe with universal laws.  
Interestingly, the primordial onset of ubiquitous decoherence 
suggests that the significance of quantum indeterminacy to explanation 
in our quasiclassical universe may need to be reconsidered. Quantum 
indeterminacy may yet be understood to define much of what our 
classical universe is like. But not through undermining universal laws 
and introducing ontological chance directly into the post-inflationary 
universe, but rather through primordial vacuum fluctuations providing 
the universe with irregular initial conditions, and thus transmitting the 
contingency of quantum phenomena throughout the universe by way of 
the spacetime trajectories of matter. 
 
Addendum. The open system rejection of laws of nature brings to mind 
a problem recently pointed out with an idealized Newtonian universe. 
McAllister (1999 and 2004) shows that a Newtonian universe is 
inconsistent. The traditional conception of a Newtonian universe is that 
it is governed by laws and initial conditions, and consistent with the D-N 
model of explanation (McAllister 1999, 327-328). If we want to explain, 
say, the motion of a body in a solar system within a Newtonian universe 
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we would consider the laws of motion in that universe, along with the 
initial velocities, trajectories and masses of the bodies in the solar 
system. However, the inconsistency that McAllister points out is that 
there is no way to introduce initial conditions into a Newtonian universe. 
These would be, in effect, a set of impermissible exogenous factors in 
what is by definition an isolated system. Thus one must posit laws that 
explain the solar system in question; this regresses infinitely, so there 
can never be any initial conditions in a Newtonian universe. Ergo, it 
must have no initial conditions, and be defined only by laws.  
However, as McAllister notes, he is only pointing out an 
inconsistency in our concept of an idealized Newtonian universe (2004, 
203); this critique does not apply to our universe because it seems to 
have a beginning, the Big Bang. In our universe there are initial 
conditions as well as regularities (that may be universal laws of nature), 
thus our real world does not fall into the paradox he points out for a 
Newtonian universe. Cartwright’s claim that “[t]he only way a condition 
could restrict the range of an association in a principled or nomological 
way would be via a more complex law” (Cartwright 1999, 138) is like 
McAllister’s observation of the inconsistency of a Newtonian universe 
that can only have laws. But just as we can immediately see that this 
inconsistency most likely does not apply to our universe because it has 
initial conditions, so too we can see how easily open system objections 
are resolved by initial conditions. The crucial question is not whether the 
open-systems view is more compelling than a scientific attempt to 
account for the complexity of our universe through laws “all the way 
down,” but whether it is more compelling than a scientific attempt to 
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explain the complexities of our universe with laws and initial 
conditions.
8
 
                                                 
8 This of course begs the question of whether we can explain the beginning of the 
universe, as in chaotic inflation, multiverse and anthropic principle scenarios (Tegmark 
2004 provides a useful classification of the possibilities). This is beyond the scope of 
our discussion. However, it is possible that laws, constants, and initial conditions of the 
universe may simply have to be accepted as “brute facts” (see Callender 2004). 
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